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Balancing Victims' Rights and Probative Value with
the Fourth Amendment Right to Security in the
Exclusion of Unlawfully Seized Evidence
"The criminal is to go free because the Constable has blundered. "'
In today's society, victims of crimes can face grave injustices by
our legal system in the name of the age-old exclusionary rule and
defendants' Fourth Amendment rights. 2 Defendants can get any
evidence in a criminal proceeding excluded from the case by show-
ing that it was unlawfully seized by the police in violation of the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition on illegal searches and seizures.3
Thus, the judicial creation that we call the exclusionary rule binds
all courts to exclude relevant evidence from the reach of our laws
based on improper police seizure. 4 Courts do not consider victims'
interests when determining whether to exclude evidence. 5 How-
ever, the purpose of this Note is not to belittle the defendant's
rights but to propose the inclusion of the victim's rights in a balanc-
ing test that weighs the proper considerations of whether evidence
should be included in any given case. According to case law, the
only factor relevant to the exclusion of evidence based on a Fourth
Amendment violation is the possibility of deterring future police
misconduct.
6
I An often quoted remark by Justice Cardozo from People v. Defore, 242
N.Y. 13, 21(1926).
2 The exclusionary rule punishes crime victims instead of addressing the
misconduct of officers conducting illegal searches. See Good-Faith Exception to
Exclusionary Rule, L.A. TIMES, March 21, 1987, Metro, Part 2, page 2.
3 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating the exclusionary
rule as against the states).
4 Yale Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility" and the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 9 (1987) (indicating that the dishonest or
reckless conduct of the police is the only consideration allowed in deciding
whether to suppress evidence).
5 When courts analyze admissibility of evidence under the exclusionary rule,
victims' interests are not considered. See generally, e.g., Overton v. Ohio, 122 S.Ct.
389 (2001); U.S. v. Williams, __ F.Supp.2d-, 2001 WL 1631417 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18,
2001); U.S. v. Newton, - F.Supp.2d_, 2002 WL 10291 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.3, 2002);
and U.S. v. McKeckney, _ F.3d. -, 2002 WL 63569 (2d Cir. Jan. 16, 2002) (unpub-
lished decision).
6 See infra Part IA.
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This Note proposes the use of other factors in determining the
admissibility of evidence under the Fourth Amendment: the rele-
vance of the evidence as to whether the defendant committed the
crime, the extent that the victim suffered from the charged crime
and may suffer if the defendant goes free, and the degree of intru-
sion by the police and whether the intrusion diluted the relevance
of the evidence to the case. Deterring police misconduct should be
dealt with by a means other than one that excludes relevant evi-
dence from our judicial process.
7
The United States Supreme Court has said that the suppres-
sion of unlawfully seized evidence is not a constitutional right,8 but
it is merely our means of deterring police from violating the Fourth
Amendment right against illegal searches and seizures (the right to
security).9 Thus, if a police officer discovers a murder weapon with-
out a warrant or probable cause, the evidence would be suppressed
without consideration of the probative value of the evidence or the
victim's interest in justice; the only substantive consideration is the
possible deterrence of future unlawful searches. 10 Rather than de-
ciding whether there was police misconduct, judges should balance
the relevant considerations before ignoring other relevant factors
of the case in the name of the Constitution. Nadine Strossen, now
President of the American Civil Liberties Union, recognized in
1988 that while the Supreme Court has and will continue to rely on
balancing tests to deal with the exclusionary rule, it has not identi-
7 See infra Part III.
8 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 630 (1965) (indicating a hesitation to
treat the exclusionary rule as an essential ingredient of the right to privacy);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (concluding that the exclusion-
ary rule is a Fourth Amendment safeguard, not a constitutionally protected right);
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 736 (1980) (indicating that the exclusionary
rule is not applied to "vindicate the constitutional rights of the defendant").
9 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656; Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 633; Calandra, 414 U.S. at
347; United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 538 (1975) (referring to a refusal to
extend the exclusionary rule where deterrence would not be served); United States
v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909
(1984)(warranting the exclusionary rule only where appreciable deterrence would
be achieved).
10 See cases cited supra note 9. The sole purpose of the rule is to deter future
unlawful seizures. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring a warrant issued
upon probable cause for lawful seizure); see generally Overton, 122 S.Ct. 389
(2001) (discussing the probable cause requirement).
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fled the "relevant and competing concerns."'1  Neither the Su-
preme Court nor Congress has acted to include other "concerns"
(or factors) into analysis under the exclusionary rule.
12
In the proposed a balancing test a judge could refuse to sup-
press evidence, upon motion of the victim, if the victim's interest in
justice along with the probative value of the evidence outweighs the
degree of intrusion on the defendant's right to security. 13 The test
would only apply where the reliability of the evidence could not be
tainted due to the unlawful means of seizure; it would not apply
where the unlawful seizure could render the evidence unreliable.
14
The former will subsequently be termed objective evidence and the
latter subjective evidence. The reliability of physical evidence, un-
like witness testimony, does not depend on any determination of
truthfulness; thus, the test would apply to physical evidence but not
witness testimony. To illustrate, whether reasonable suspicion is
present does not influence the reliability of the fact that a gun was
present; however, whether a witness was tortured does seriously in-
fluence the reliability of any testimony extracted. 15 Finally, this test
should apply only where a victim has been deprived of a cognizable
interest above and beyond that of merely being a citizen of a gov-
ernment that does not tolerate crime. It is society, through its gov-
ernment, that has infringed on the defendant's right to security
and is thereby a wrongdoer. 16 However, when there are identifi-
11 Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Set-
ting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, N.Y.U.L. REV.
1173, 1176-77 (1988) (arguing to include a "least intrusive means necessary" ele-
ment into Fourth Amendment balancing).
12 See discussion infra Part III.
13 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 909 (forcefully suggesting a balancing test to permit
a good-faith exception). See e.g., Kamisar, supra note 4, at 6. Kamisar proposes a
balancing test that would use the seriousness of the offense committed. See also
discussion infra Part II.B.2 (explaining standing to invoke the proposed test).
14 See infra Part II.A (discussing objective versus subjective evidence).
15 See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 685 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (contending that a con-
viction should not be based on a confession wrung from a defendant rendering him
the "instrument of his own conviction."). This rational applies equally as well to
witness testimony. See also Richard Davis, The Exclusionary Rule, N.Y. L. J., Oct.
16, 1997 at 2. Exclusion is appropriate when the seizure renders the evidence un-
reliable, as is the case with a forced confession. Id.
16 Leon, 468 U.S. at 974 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). In a democracy the officials are servants of the people; as such, policemen's
actions are attributable to the master and society is thereby responsible for the
officer's wrongs. Id.
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able victims who have suffered irreparable harm and have not par-
ticipated in the unlawful seizure, we should not deprive these
innocent victims of their right to justice; 7 at least not when the
State is the only party with "unclean hands" from violating the de-
fendant's right to security. This scheme would exclude evidence of
drug crimes from the reach of the proposed test since the only vic-
tim is the society whose government has violated its own Constitu-
tional mandate.
Part I of this Note will discuss the state of the exclusionary rule
and victims' rights. Section A will explore the rule and its excep-
tions and how analysis under the rule is based solely on deterrence.
Section B will examine the purposes of our right to security. Sec-
tion C will discuss sanctions versus exclusion. as a means of deter-
ring police misconduct. Section D will explain how we can protect
our right to security in light of the proposed balancing test. Section
E will note how victims have had rights in criminal law in the past.
Part II will go into the proposed balancing test for the discretionary
exception to the exclusionary rule. Section A will explain the test,
its applicability and its factors. Section B will discuss justifications,
interests and violations involved; this includes subsection 1: proba-
tive value of the evidence, subsection 2: the victim's historical and
current interest injustice, and subsection 3: the degree of intrusion
into the defendant's right to security. Section C will examine the
proper location for the power to cause evidence to be excluded and
how the balancing test influences this location. Section D will dis-
cuss the competing interests. Section E will provide an example of
where the proposed test will alter existing practice. Part III will
conclude the Note and suggest possible means of implementation.
17 See discussion infra Part I.E. Furthermore, the Department of State has
recognized victims' interest in justice in the adjudication of Mohammed Hamadei
who was to be tried in Germany with regard to the TWA #847 case; the State
Department posted a bulletin saying, ..... prosecution in Germany of Hamadei
with full punishment will satisfy our interest in justice for the victims of Hamadei's
crimes .... West Germany to Prosecute Terrorist, Department of State Bulletin,
Aug., 1987, Terrorism, at 85. See Jerry Adler et al, Bloodied But Unbowed",
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 3, 1995, at 54. "[T]he criminal process should focus on the harm
done to real people, not to a collective abstraction." Gwynn Davis & Richard
Lindley, From the Crime to the Ridiculous, THE GUARDIAN (London), June 3,
1992, at 23.
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I. THE PURPOSE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND OUR
RIGHT TO SECURITY
A. The Rule and Its Exceptions
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
18
The Supreme Court has created the exclusionary rule to promote
the right to privacy secured by the Fourth Amendment by ruling
that evidence seized by officers in violation of this provision will not
be admissible at trial.19 The Supreme Court has found that viola-
tion of this provision by unlawful seizure occurs at the time the of-
ficer unlawfully searches or seizes upon the defendant. 20 Thus, the
intrusion has already occurred at the time of the suppression hear-
ing, and the court is not in a position to redress the defendant as the
victim of a search.21 This leads to the conclusion, as the Court has
stated, that exclusion of evidence unlawfully seized is not a personal
constitutional right. 22 Furthermore, the rule is not an explicit re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment.23 Rather than a personal
18 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 630.
20 "[T]he ruptured privacy of the (illegal search) victims' homes and effects
cannot be restored. Reparation comes too late." Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 637. See
Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347 (noting that the exclusionary rule is not intended to
redress the victim of the search). The Fourth Amendment wrong has been com-
pleted by the illegal search or seizure itself, and the rule cannot and should not try
to remedy the invasion already accomplished. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906.
21 The determination of admissibility at a suppression hearing is after and
separate from the security violation. Janis, 428 U.S. at 443. The suppression hear-
ing derivatively uses the evidence unlawfully obtained and cannot thereby create a
new Fourth Amendment wrong. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354 (also noting that the
"wrong, committed in this case, is fully accomplished by the original search with-
out probable cause").
22 Relying on the practices of "most of the English-speaking world", the
Court indicates hesitation in treating a remedy as an "essential ingredient" of the
right to security and privacy. Linkletter 381 U.S. at 630.
23 Id.
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constitutional right, the exclusionary rule is merely a judicially cre-
ated remedy to a difficult situation.24 But what about our Fourth
Amendment rights that the Court is attempting to secure? And
does the exclusionary rule not protect a defendant from the conse-
quences resulting from the unlawful search or seizure? 25 Prior to its
decision to extend the requirement to the States in Mapp,26 the
Court relied on its supervisory power over the federal courts to sup-
port the exclusionary rule.27 Courts now apply the exclusionary
rule even to state officials. 28 In Mapp, the Court found the exclu-
sionary rule to be of constitutional origin in order to impose it on
the States,29 yet it later insists that the primary, if not sole, purpose
is to deter undesirable police conduct.
30
Within this framework, the exclusionary rule as solely being a
deterrent to police violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court
has established a series of exceptions to the exclusionary rule's ap-
plicability. First, the Court held the exclusionary rule not to apply
retrospectively upon cases decided prior to the Mapp case since de-
terrence is a prospective factor and exclusion of evidence could not
affect police action that had occurred before creation of the rule.
31
Second, the Court has held the rule inapplicable to grand jury pro-
24 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. Cf Janis, 428 U.S. at 458-9 (refusing to extend
the rule to further an "undesirable supervisory role over police officers" and indi-
cating a deference to the other branches of government). See also Leon, 468 U.S.
at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (sharing the view of the Court that exclusion is
"not a constitutionally compelled corollary of the Fourth Amendment"). Cf
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 649 (indicating that the exclusionary rule is of constitutional
origin).
25 If physical evidence can be unlawfully seized and used against the defen-
dant, then the Fourth Amendment guarantees of security and privacy have no
value. Leon, 468 U.S. at 936 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Furthermore, there is a
"connection between the evidence-gathering role of the police and the evidence-
admitting function of the courts", see id. at 933, and this implicates an approval of
the means of seizure by the court that admits the evidence. See also Mapp, 367
U.S. at 684-5 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing the admission of coerced
confessions).
26 367 U.S. at 660 (holding the exclusionary incorporated so as to bind the
States as well as the federal courts).
27 Janis, 428 U.S. at 445 (noting that the Court had been "invoking its 'super-
visory power over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts.'").
28 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) (stating that the exclu-
sionary rule will apply to state officials if federal officials doing the same job would
violate the exclusionary rule).
29 See 367 U.S. at 649.
30 428 U.S. at 446.
31 Linkletter, 381 U.S. 618. See also Mapp, 367 U.S. 643.
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ceedings since the grand jury is not constrained by the rules of evi-
dence and propriety that are granted in a trial.32 Third, the Court
held that the rule does not extend to civil cases where one sover-
eign, the state government, unlawfully seized evidence from an-
other sovereign, the Federal Government since deterrence did not
outweigh societal costs. 33 Fourth, the Court has created a "good-
faith exception" by holding the rule inapplicable when an officer
acts in reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a magistrate ulti-
mately found to be invalid. 34 Furthermore, a parolee's consent and
status as a parolee are relevant to the reasonableness of the search
because of the amplified importance of deterrence when dealing
with a parolee. 35 These exceptions arose due to the rule's posture
as a remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
through deterrence, and as such the rule is limited to situations
where remedial goals are "most efficaciously served". 36 Thus, the
entire framework of the rule is focused on deterrence.
There are also a few procedural hurdles entailed within exclu-
sionary rule jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has held that fed-
eral courts may not review, after conviction, Fourth Amendment
claims that were provided "an opportunity for full and fair litiga-
tion" in state court.37 Only a person whose rights have been in-
fringed may invoke the exclusionary rule; evidence unlawfully
seized from someone other than the defendant is not subject to sup-
pression due to the rule.38 To establish standing, the defendant
must sufficiently show that he has a "reasonable expectation of pri-
32 Calandra, 414 U.S. 338.
33 Janis, 428 U.S. 433.
34 Leon, 468 U.S. 897.
35 See U.S. v. Williams, __ F.Supp.2d-, 2001 WL 1631417 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
18, 2001) (allowing the admission of a firearm seized by parole officers from defen-
dant's mother's home prior to obtaining consent of the residents where defendant
was a parolee convicted of three crimes each punishable by imprisonment for over
one year and each being either a violent felony or serious drug offense, which
makes it unlawful for such a parolee to possess a firearm by statute, and where a
social worker had informed the parole office of a threat by defendant that he
would kill his mother and step-father).
36 Janis, 428 U.S. at 446-7.
37 Bradley v. Nagle, 212 F.3d 559, 564 (2000). See generally, Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976).
38 Janis, 428 U.S. at 447. See also infra Part II.A. (discussing victim
standing).
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vacy."' 39 However, the State could rebut this by showing, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that an owner or lawful custodian
freely and voluntarily consented to the search.40 The fact that the
Court uses the exclusionary rule primarily for deterrence, has cre-
ated a "good-faith" exception, and recognizes the right against war-
rantless searches as an alienable one, further seems to draw the
conclusion that the exclusionary rule is not a constitutional man-
date. Thus, if the executive, legislative or judicial branch can create
a less intrusive means of deterrence, 41 we might see the end of a
rule with such high costs to the truth-finding function of the judici-
ary.42 This would seem to imply that if other means of preserving
the rights to security and privacy exist, then the exclusionary rule
would be rendered unnecessary. The Court would also not con-
demn a State for not applying the exclusionary rule where other
methods of deterrence are consistently enforced and equally
effective.
43
Why does the degree of police misconduct necessarily relate to
whether evidence may be used against a person accused of a crime?
If police misconduct influenced or diluted the relevance of the evi-
dence to the case, then this should weigh heavily on whether to
include the evidence. But police misconduct alone should not im-
munize defendants from having relevant evidence presented against
them. 44
39 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)(denying a motion to suppress a
sawed-off rifle and shells seized from a car in which defendants were passengers
because the Fourth Amendment only protects places where the defendant has an
expectation of privacy; because defendants had no property or possessory interest
in the vehicle there was no expectation of privacy). See also United States v. Mor-
gan, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15905, 10-11.
40 United States v. Arbalaez, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16883, 12.
41 See Strossen, supra note 11 (arguing for a least intrusive means necessary
factor to be applied in the cost-benefit balancing in determinations of whether the
exclusionary rule should apply).
42 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 652 (noting that circumstances have proven it necessary
to incorporate the exclusionary rule because other remedies have proven futile and
even the California Supreme Court recognized that other remedies have failed to
secure Fourth Amendment rights).
43 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 630. It is often suggested that a system for alterna-
tive means of deterrence be developed other than using suppression of the evi-
dence. See e.g., Davis, supra note 15.
44 See Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21.
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B. The Purposes of Our Right to Security
When the founders of our country drafted the Fourth Amend-
ment to the Bill of Rights they must have had something in mind
that they were trying to prevent.45 It is seriously doubtful that the
Framers purpose was to protect the guilty. Their purpose must
have been to create an atmosphere of security for the innocent.
46
Thus, deterrence and a sense of security among society seem to be
the proper goals. As Professor Strossen puts it, "[M]assive or intru-
sive searches or seizures may undermine individuals' respect for the
legal system."' 47 However, excluding the evidence does not punish
the wrong-doing officer, yet it may set free the wrong-doing defen-
dant.48 What about security from known criminals? It is also im-
portant for society to believe that our system works to put the guilty
behind bars while protecting the innocent to ensure a proper sense
of security.49 We must deter not only police intrusion but also
crime in order to promote the ultimate goal of full security.50 Does
security from the police necessarily entail the release of obviously
guilty criminals? Surely we can better deter the police without such
high costs to society and to the crime victims as releasing obviously
guilty defendants.
Two types of infringement have arisen as to the violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Are we trying to protect the rights of the gen-
eral population not to be intruded upon without good reason, or are
we trying to protect the rights of defendants who are trying to hide
their crimes? The answer must be the former. It would contradict
common sense to say that our right to security was created in order
to provide criminals a shield under which they may hide from the
law. Through the exclusionary rule, our right to security might pro-
vide some means for criminals to hide the evidence of their crimes.
However, if we allow judges the discretion to make exceptions to
45 The Framers were deeply suspicious of the possibility of warrants not
based on probable cause. Leon, 468 U.S. at 972 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Presumably they wanted to protect the innocent from unrea-
sonable intrusion by officers trying to harass them.
46 See Strossen, supra note 11, at 1199. Societal costs of unreasonable or gen-
eral searches or seizures include damage to our collective security, which is just as
threatened by police invasions as by criminal invasions. Id.
47 Strossen, supra note 11, at 1198.
48 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 632.
49 Davis, supra note 15, at 2.
50 Davis, supra note 15, at 2.
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the rule by balancing the interests and we generally punish wrong-
doing officers for their offenses, we may yet be secure from both
the police and the criminals, and the honorable purpose of the
Fourth Amendment would not be polluted.
C. Deterrence: Exclusion versus Sanction
There have been many proposals for ways to deter police from
unlawful invasion of privacy besides the exclusion of relevant evi-
dence.5 1 It may be true that the police are deterred from unlawful
searches and seizures due to a fear that the fruits of their labor will
be rendered useless,52 but the fear of sanctions or suspension surely
weighs more heavily than the possibility of exclusion in an officer's
mind when deciding whether to go ahead with a search.53 This is
especially true considering that, at the time of the officer's delibera-
tion, the trial is far in the future and the means of seizure will not
directly affect the officer unless there is the possibility of sanctions.
The only deterrence of the rule seems to rely on the officer's duty
to uphold the law. Furthermore, we could sanction-the agency for
which the officer or official is working.54 Agency sanctioning would
create an incentive to better educate the officers of that agency as
to the boundaries and limitations of proper search and seizure and
would create punitive measures within the agency to further deter
misconduct. 55 However, consideration of all possible means of de-
terrence is beyond the scope of this Note. Yet it is important to
note that the Court has relied on the lack of empirical evidence that
51 Kamisar, supra note 4, at 35.
52 It is necessarily of great concern to a police officer to have the evidence he
has acquired in the course of his duty excluded from use in the trial. Janis, 428 U.S.
at 448. See also Calandra, 414 U.S. at 351. The use of exclusion as a deterrent to
police misconduct is from the removal of an inducement to violate the Fourth
Amendment. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 557.
53 Even after fifteen years of being in effect between 1961 and 1976 the ex-
clusionary rule had not yet been able to produce empirical results as to deterrence.
Janis, 428 U.S. at 446.
54 See Davis, supra note 15, at 2. One option is to refuse to apply the exclu-
sionary rule to agencies that meet standards, observable by an outside monitor, of
training and punish officers found to deliberately violate the rights of suspects, and
an additional option, would be to allow sanctions on the law enforcement agency
when one of its officer employees deliberately violates the suspect's constitutional
rights. Id.
55 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 920 (indicating the importance of police training
programs designed to educate officers and emphasize the importance to work
within the limits of the Fourth Amendment).
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exclusion actually deters future security violations,56 so empirical
studies could change application of the rule. Officers should obvi-
ously be sanctioned only for intentional, as opposed to inadvertent,
misconduct on this separate issue of police misconduct punishment.
D. Protecting Our Right to Security
At what point in time does a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment right to security occur? The Supreme Court has decided that
the violation occurs when the officer unlawfully seizes the evi-
dence.5 7 This has led to the determination that the exclusion of evi-
dence is not a right protected by the Fourth Amendment. 58 The
theory is that the defendant's right to security cannot be protected
by exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence since that right has al-
ready been violated.59 However, it seems that if the evidence can-
not be used at trial, the defendant's right to security remains intact.
The defendant's right to security is only truly violated when conse-
quences are faced (such as wrongful conviction) due to the actions
of the police. It is true that the police have discovered the evidence
protected by the right to security, but if they are powerless to use it
against the defendant, the defendant's legal security is preserved.
The problem with suppression is that through seizure by the police
society has been made aware and individual citizens might even be
aware of the evidence, we may feel robbed of justice when the jury
is prevented from considering that evidence.
56 Leon, 468 U.S. at 918 (noting that empirical research had not established
that deterrence resulted from the rule).
57 See Janis, 428 U.S. at 443 (acknowledging that admissibility of evidence is
a determination that is made after and separate from the Fourth Amendment vio-
lation). See also Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (noting that "The wrong condemned by the
Fourth Amendment is 'fully accomplished' by the unlawful search or seizure itself
... and the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to 'cure the invasion of
the defendant's rights which he has already suffered.'").
58 See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 (indicating that the exclusionary rule is "a
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights gener-
ally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the
party aggrieved"); see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (quoting this language from
Calandra).
59 Leon, 468 U.S. at 906. The Court states that "the exclusionary rule is
neither intended nor able to cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he
has already suffered." Id. See also Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354. There the Court said
that using questions based on unlawfully seized evidence "work no new Fourth
Amendment wrong." Id.
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There are different types of consequences that arise from an
unlawful seizure. First, society is harmed because people cannot
feel secure in their homes from unlawful intrusion.60 Second, the
individual defendant is harmed because his privacy has been vio-
lated. 61 The societal problem can be resolved by punishing those
responsible for the unlawful seizure. 62 If people see these wrongful
actors being penalized for their actions, the people will feel secure
in that our legal system will not tolerate unlawful invasion of pri-
vacy. The individual problem can be resolved by the proposed bal-
ancing test. If the defendant has been more violated by a seizure
contaminating the relevance of the evidence, the evidence will be
excluded; but if an evasive criminal tries to rely on a technicality,
the judge can protect the rights of the victim.
E. A Note on Victims' Rights in Criminal Law
In the early days of criminal jurisprudence it was the victim
who instituted criminal proceedings. 63 This was based on the idea
60 See Strossen, supra at note 11, at 1198 (noting that unlawful seizure under-
mines societal individuals' respect for our system of law and fosters insecurity
among the people).
61 See Strossen, supra at note 11, at 1197 (indicating that the Supreme
Court's reliance on subjective intrusiveness, or harm to the individual defendant, is
misplaced due to the societal effects of unpunished unlawful seizures).
62 See supra Part I.C. See also Kamisar, supra note 4, at 49 (indicating that
justice is left ineffective when the officer is not directly punished and revealing that
exclusion does not put the "police in a worse position than if they had never vio-
lated the Constitution in the first place"); Davis, supra at note 15, at 2 (suggesting
alternative means of deterring unlawful seizures other than exclusion of evidence).
The Court has also indicated that a State's reliance on equally effective methods
other than exclusion, which do not fall below minimal requirements of Due Pro-
cess, could not be condemned as an insufficient substitution for Fourth Amend-
ment protection. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 630.
63 See Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9
HARV. J.J. & PUB. POL'Y 357, 359 (1986) (arguing for more victim participation in
the prosecutorial process); see also Richard Barajas & Scott Nelson, The Proposed
Crime Victims' Constitutional Amendment: Working Toward a Proper Balance, 49
BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 8 (1997) (discussing the proposed amendment to the Constitu-
tion and similar state provisions); see also Rachel King, Why a Victims' Rights Con-
stitutional Amendment Is a Bad Idea: Practical Experiences from Crime Victims, 68
U. CIN. L. REV. 357, 366-7 (2000) (arguing that giving victims rights in criminal
proceedings is a step backwards); see also Peggy Tobolowsky, Victim Participation
in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen Years after the President's Task Force on
Victims of Crime, 25 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 21, 23 (1999)
(analyzing notice and presence rights of victims at criminal proceedings and the
presidential task force on victim's rights).
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that the best way to assure prosecution was to rely on the aggrieved
party.64 Prosecution was historically a private matter, and victims
came to regard invocation of criminal proceedings as a matter of
right.65 Since that time, the task of bringing criminals to justice has
been delegated to government prosecutors. 66 This change was due
to an idea that prosecution should serve societal, rather than indi-
vidual victims', interests.67 During the change to prosecution in the
name of the public, victims have been gradually pushed out of the
criminal process.68 In the 1970s, victims' rights moved to the fore-
front of political debate and were recognized by President Ronald
Regan when he began a Task Force on Victims' Crime in 1982.69
.Many state constitutions and federal statutes now provide for
victims' rights, and there is a strong movement to provide for them
in the federal constitution. 70 Even some national district attorneys
recognize the government's duty to consider victims in the criminal
process.71 The main force of the movement, however, has been lim-
ited to rights to notice (of developments or final disposition), to
have personal property quickly returned, to prevent criminals from
profiting by sale of the story, etc.72
All of this tends to show that our society recognizes that vic-
tims of crimes have some interest in the prosecution of the person
or people who harmed them. Even though prosecutors control
criminal cases today, we still seem to agree that victims have a rec-
64 Cardenas, supra note 63.
65 See Cardenas, supra note 63 at 362.
66 Cardenas, supra note at 361-2 (discussing delegation of prosecutorial
power in the Prosecution of the Offenses Act); see also Barajas and Nelson, 49
BAYLOR L. REV. at 8-11 (discussing victims historical role in prosecution); see also
Tobolowsky, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT at 25.
67 See Tobolowsky, supra note 63, at 26; see also Barajas, supra note 63, at 8-
11.
68 See supra note 62 (discussion in articles of the history of victims' rights in
prosecution).
69 See Tobolowsky, supra note 63, at 29.
70 See generally Barajas, supra note 63, at 1; The movement is extremely
strong, with as high as ninety-two percent approval on some state amendments. Id.
at 16; see generally Sue Cellini, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COmp. L. 839 (1997) (arguing
for victims to have rights in a criminal proceeding and giving a comprehensive look
at victims' rights in criminal trials from past to present).
71 See Kirk Nahra, The Role of Victims in Criminal Investigations and Prose-
cutions, PROSECUTORS, Aug. 1999, at 28; cf John Kaye, President's Message, PROS-
ECUTORS, Jun. 1997 at 5 (discussing the potential problems with a victims' rights
amendment to the federal constitution).
72 See Barajas, supra note 63, at 12.
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ognizable interest in criminal proceedings and should be involved in
the prosecutorial process.
II. A DISCRETIONARY BALANCING TEST
A. The Test and Its Factors
This Note proposes the application of a balancing test 73 to the
suppression of unlawfully seized evidence using recognized factors
in new ways. The Constitution grants protection only against un-
reasonable searches and seizures. 74 The right to security is qualified
with a reasonableness limitation, and this arguably creates room for
balancing of interests.75 As threshold issues, in deciding whether to
apply the test, a judge would consider the nature of the evidence
and decide whether it is objective or subjective evidence 76 and
whether there is a victim with a cognizable interest in inclusion of
the evidence that is not polluted by wrongdoing related to the al-
leged act. 77 If the evidence is subjective evidence or there is no
cognizable interest to the victim, the exclusionary rule as it stands
would apply.78 But if not, the judge would balance the victim's in-
terest in justice along with the probative value of the evidence
73 Strossen, supra note 11, at,1180-81. There is a strong reliance on balanc-
ing in constitutional contexts, and there is also a desire for cost-benefit balancing
in all Fourth Amendment situations by such figures as Richard Posner, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and other Supreme Court Justices. Id. The reasonableness aspect of
the Fourth Amendment in particular might call for such balancing. Id at 1192. See
also Newton, supra note 5, at 8 (relying on U.S. v. Knights, 122 S.Ct. 587 (balancing
defendant's privacy interests against governmental interests to determine the de-
gree of suspicion necessary to search the probationer's house)).
74 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
75 See Strossen, supra note 11, at 1192. See also Lewis Katz & Jay Shapiro,
NEW YORK SUPPRESSION MANUAL: ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, CON-
FESSION, IDENTIFICATION, § 5.01 (2001)(discussing the reasonableness aspect). A
balancing test weighing the public purpose against the nature of the intrusion can
be substituted for the warrant or probable cause requirement. Id.
76 See infra Part II.B.1.
77 See infra Part II.B.2.
78 It must be noted that the balancing test proposed by this Note is merely an
exception to the exclusionary rule as it stands. To invoke the rule there must be a
victim with standing to invoke it. As where the person whose privacy was infringed
must invoke the exclusionary rule. See Janis, 428 U.S. at 447. There must be a
victim who can and will invoke the proposed balancing exception. The reason for
this is that the exclusionary rule protects the defendant's right to privacy, and the
theory that this balancing exception relies on is that the victim's interest in justice
might be sufficient to overcome the defendant's interest in privacy, at least where
the probative value is high and the degree of intrusion is low. Id.
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against the degree of intrusion on the defendant's right to secur-
ity.79 If the victims' rights and probative value outweigh the degree
of intrusion, the judge could refuse to suppress the evidence despite
applicability of the exclusionary rule. While these may be difficult
decisions they seem more relevant to admissibility than does a di-
rect analysis of only police misconduct that excludes the question of
whether that misconduct influenced the reliability of the evidence.
Admissibility should be based on truth finding rather than deter-
rence of police misconduct.
Objective versus subjective evidence. This may be a novel dis-
tinction, but it seems that logically the characteristics of a piece of
evidence define its relevance. The characteristics of objective evi-
dence cannot be altered by the means of acquisition. Take, for ex-
ample, a cigarette holder. If offered to show that the defendant is a
smoker, its relevance may be defined by the existence of identifying
marks. If offered to show that the defendant is fond of gold, its
relevance may be defined by its composition. These characteristics
can be examined and are not dependent on the means of seizure.
On the other hand, the characteristics of subjective evidence can be
altered by the means of acquisition. Take, for example, coerced
witness testimony. If offered to prove the assertion made, its rele-
vance depends on the circumstances under which it was given.
These circumstances are its characteristics. If the statements were
made under duress or under fear of torture, they are not reliable.
However, these characteristics cannot be examined and are defined
by the means of acquisition. Thus, objective evidence is proper for
exception to the exclusionary rule, while subjective evidence is not.
Victim Standing:0 Under the proposed test a victim with
standing would be required to invoke the proposed balancing test.81
This notion of standing is crucial to the test because without the
victim's interest in justice there would be nothing to outweigh the
79 See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172. In applying a test that bal-
ances probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice, the Court weighed
the factors of the test and analyzed relevance in a way similar to the proposed
balancing test. See id.
80 See generally, Susan Bandes, Victim Standing, 1999 UTAH L. REV
331(1999) (discussing the citizen victim standing issue and specifically arguing that
victims are only granted standing when the prosecution's agenda is served).
81 See discussion infra Part II.B.2. The victim should have to allege to have
been injured by the defendant in the course of the charged criminal act and be able
to support this allegation.
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defendant's right to security because probative value of evidence
alone cannot outweigh the personal constitutional right of the de-
fendant. In Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,82 the Court held, however,
that "a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the
prosecution or non-prosecution of another," and "a citizen lacks
standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting attorney when he
himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution. '83 It
has been argued that this language was overly broad.84 Although
the judiciary has renounced any cognizable interest in victim prose-
cution, it has not precluded any legislature from enacting statutes
that confer standing.85 The victim's interest in prosecution is real,86
and the legislatures should recognize it. It is the prosecutor's job to
run the case; but when the government, which the prosecutor repre-
sents, is guilty of wrongly seizing evidence, it should take the rights
of a victim who was injured by the defendant to overcome applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule.
Factors of the Test: The probative value of evidence is its de-
gree of relevance.87 Relevance is determined by looking to whether
the evidence makes it more or less likely that the proposition it
purports to prove is true.88 If the evidence does either, then it is
relevant.89 Probative value, then, is the degree to which the evi-
82 Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (where a mother sought to
enjoin the state prosecutor from refusing to prosecute based on a belief that the
child support statute did not apply to parents of illegitimate children). The court
decided that since imprisoning the father would not serve the goal of obtaining
child support, the mother had no cognizable interest in prosecution. Id. at 617-8.
83 Id. at 619.
84 See Sue Cellini, The Proposed Victims' Rights Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States: Opening the Door of the Criminal Justice System to the
Victim, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 839, note 81 (1997) (generally arguing for the
proposed Constitutional Amendment for victim's rights). Cf. supra Part I.E. (dis-
cussing historical victim prosecution).
85 See Linda, 410 U.S. at 617. The legislature can do this by creating legal
rights that, when invaded, create statutory harm that is judicially cognizable. See
id. at note 3.
86 See Cellini, supra note 84 at 850 (noting that despite the ruling the vic-
tim's interest is no less real).
87 See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
88 FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining relevant evidence). See also WEINSTEIN'S
FEDERAL EVIDENCE, Weinstein Evidence United States Rules, Rule 401,
§401.04(2)(a) (Matthew Bender and Co., Inc. 2000) (hereinafter "Weinstein
Evidence").
89 FED. R. EVID. 401.04(1) (recognizing that analysis of relevance is essential
to the determination of probative value).
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dence makes it more or less likely that the proposition it purports to
prove is true.90 It is certainly more important to include highly rele-
vant evidence than minimally relevant evidence. The degree of rel-
evance, or probative value, of a piece of evidence to the truth is a
cornerstone of our legal system.91 If the probative value of all the
evidence is beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty,
then our system of justice allows conviction. 92 If evidence is not
relevant, then that alone requires exclusion because the evidence
does not tend to prove any fact necessary to proper adjudication. 93
On the other hand, evidence with a high probative value is one of
the driving forces behind adjudication in our system of jurispru-
dence.94 Yet another such driving force is the victim's interest in
prosecuting the perpetrator. 95
The Founding Fathers surely supported protecting the rights of
the innocent to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. 96 But what
about the innocent victim's right to privacy and security as against
criminals, as well as police? The victim's rights have been violated
by the criminal and should not be set aside because the police, over
whom the victim has no control, unlawfully intruded upon the per-
petrator. In applying the test, the judge should use the severity of
the crime, to which the disputed evidence points, in assessing the
weight of the victim's interest in justice.97 The judge might consider
whether the disputed evidence is necessary for the commission of
the crime. The judge should then proportionately relate the values
90 FED. R. EvID. 401.04(2)(b) (analyzing probative value through relevance).
See also FED. R. EvID. 401.04(1) (stating that "[e]vidence tending to make a conse-
quential fact 'less probable' is just as relevant as evidence tending to make it 'more
probable"').
91 FED. R. EVID. 401.02(1) (indicating that relevance is the "cornerstone on
which any rational system of evidence rests").
92 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)(explicitly holding that "the Due Pro-
cess Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.").
93 FED. R. EvID. 402 (stating that "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not
admissible"). This determination is our society's means of adjudicating conflicts.
Id.
94 See Gregory Wallance, Rule of Law: The Exclusionary Rule's Price to So-
ciety is Too High, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1995.
95 See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
96 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
97 See Kamisar, supra note 4 at 3.
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of the relevance of the evidence and the victim's interest in justice
to balance against the defendant's security interest.98
The degree of intrusion on the defendant's right to security de-
termines the weight on the scale in favor of the defendant. 99 The
less intrusive the seizure, the less right the defendant has to com-
plain of the method of seizure. When the probative value and vic-
tifii's interest in justice are very high, a defendant who moves for
suppression of the evidence should have to base the suppression on
d high degree of intrusion to overcome the weight on the side of
inclusion.100 If the government enforcement agency has blatantly
disregarded the defendant's rights, the defendant's right to security
has increased and might outweigh any and all interests in the inclu-
sion of the evidence. However, if the violation by the government
enforc ement agency is minimal and technical, this should not be al-
lowed to overcome the interests protected by inclusion of the
evidence. 101
These seem to be the most important factors in deciding
whether to suppress evidence based on unlawful seizure. This is not
to say that other relevant factors will not arise in various cases. For
example, if the victim is partially responsible for the unlawful intru-
sion on the defendant, this should weigh in.the defendant's favor.
The victim's "unclean hands" would add weight on the side of ex-
cluding the evidence. 10 2 Judges should use their discretion and
judgment in considering other factors depending on the circum-
stances of the case at bar.10 3 The Supreme Court seems to rely
heavily on deterring future security violations by the police.10 4 This
deterrence problem, however, should be dealt with by a means
other than blinding justice to relevant and proper facts.
98 See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (discussing proportional relation of these
factors).
99 See discussion infra Part l.D.
100 This is due to the presumption that the proposed balancing test will be a
type of affirmative defense to the exclusionary rule.
101 See Kamisar, supra note 4 (generally supporting the assessment of the de-
gree of the degree of police misconduct in determining whether to suppress
evidence).
102 Although the "unclean hands" doctrine relates to civil cases in equity, the
justice that requires the doctrine for cases in equity should make it a relevant con-
cern here. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
103 See WEINSTEIN EVIDENCE § 401.02(l), supra note 82.
104 See discussion supra Part I.A.
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B. Rights, Interests and Justifications of the Test
There are competing interests in the suppression of evidence.
There are the interests of the victim, the interests of the defendant,
and the interests of society. Society preserves its interests through
government by prosecution of actions our society refuses to toler-
ate. When an act that society prohibits does occur, it is the govern-
ment that acts as the arm of society to enforce and uphold our
societal interests.10 5 However, when a government enforcement
agency commits an unlawful seizure, the societal interests are pol-
luted by wrongdoing. Wrongdoing on the part of an interested
party should weigh against that party (the unclean hands doctrine)
in criminal as well as equitable cases. 106 Thus, the defendant's right
to security should outweigh any "unclean" interest. However, even
though the victim's interest in justice is generally not polluted, its
importance is limited by the probative value of the evidence. 10 7
Thus, when the victim's interest in the inclusion of evidence is
neither polluted by wrongdoing, nor diminished by irrelevance, it
could outweigh the defendant's interest in security, especially if that
defendant's right to security has not been significantly intruded
upon. Thus, this test could only apply to crimes with victims be-
cause, without a victim's unpolluted interest, the unclean interests
of the government could not overcome the defendant's right to
security.
1. Interests and justifications involved: probative value. Pro-
bative value is determined by looking to the degree to which a piece
of evidence makes it more or less likely that the defendant commit-
ted the alleged act, (relevance).10 8 Probative value should weigh
105 Democratic government is by the people and the people's consent creates
the power under which the government acts. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPEN-
DENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776). See also Zimbabwe; NCA Should Avoid the Pitfalls of
Going Political, AFRICA NEWS SERVICE, INC., Apr. 30, 1999 (stating that in a civil
society people "speak and act through their government").
106 The unclean hands doctrine is an equitable defense. See California v.
American Stores, 495 U.S. 271, 296 (1990) (recognizing "unclean hands" as an
equitable defense).
107 See infra Part II.B.2.
108 FED. R. EVID. 401 "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." Id.
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into our willingness to suppress evidence. 10 9 Highly relevant evi-
dence, which could make or break a case, is much more essential to
true justice than is extraneous or superfluous evidence that could
mislead the jury.110 Thus, the more a piece of evidence tends to
prove a defendant is guilty, the higher the probative value, the
more we should hesitate to suppress it."' However, when the evi-
dence is not highly probative of the fact it is purported to prove, or
when it is more probative of a different fact, which is an improper
basis of adjudication; this should weigh against its inclusion and for
suppression.112
The probative value of evidence is an important consideration
because one of our primary goals in a trial is to discern the truth.113
The Court has emphasized the importance of including all relevant
evidence in a grand jury proceeding in order to discover the
truth, 14 but should this be so easily overcome by a desire to deter
police misconduct when it could be done by less intrusive means in
a jury trial? 1 5 Excluding evidence with a high probative value sig-
nificantly increases the chance that an obviously guilty defendant
will go free due to evidence being withheld from the jury that eve-
ryone watching the trial knew about.116 Thus, the probative value,
or degree of relevance, of the evidence in question should be con-
109 See FED. R. EvID. 402. Relevance is a major factor of admissibility since
relevant evidence is generally included and irrelevant evidence is excluded. Id.
110 See Peltier, 422 U.S. at 539 (using the fact that the reliability and relevancy
of evidence found in the defendant's trunk was unquestioned to support, at least in
part, the holding that a previous decision should not be retroactive). See also FED.
R. EvID. 403. In federal courts and many state courts relevant evidence may be
excluded when the danger of misleading the jury, unfair prejudice, or confusion of
issues substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. Id.
M See FED. R. EvID. 403.
112 Id.
113 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 900 (indicating the truth finding function as the
counter tension to deterrence of unlawful seizures). See also WEINSTEIN Evi-
DENCE § 401.02(1), and see William Westmiller, Exclusionary Rule Contends Two
Wrongs Make a Right, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Dec. 3, 1998, at B07 (emphasizing
that throwing out truthful fact goes against century old common-law principles).
114 See Janis, 414 U.S. at 343 (outlining the goals and purposes of a grand jury
proceeding).
115 See Strossen, supra at note 11 (generally supporting the use of a least in-
trusive means factor in the suppression of unlawfully seized evidence).
16 See Kamisar, supra note 4, at 2 (suggesting that it is more morally repre-
hensible to release an apparently guilty defendant than to admit relevant, yet
tainted, evidence).
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sidered in a decision regarding the suppression of evidence unlaw-
fully seized.
2. Interests and justifications involved: the victim's interest in
justice. On the same side of the scale as probative value of the evi-
dence is the victim's interest in justice and truth.' 17 The main force
behind considering the victim's rights in a suppression hearing
would seem to derive from the same type of right as a defendant
asserting his interest in suppression. The defendant had a right to
security, which was violated,11 and the Court seeks to deter the
wrong-doer, the police, from repeating the wrong.1 19 Likewise, the
victim had a right, which was violated, and our courts should seek
to deter the wrong-doer, a defendant who has infringed on another
person's rights, from repeating the wrong. 120 If a defendant can in-
voke the exclusionary rule to deter police from intruding upon
those of his kind, the victim should be able to invoke a balancing
test to deter criminal intrusion upon people of the victim's kind. It
should be noted here that the proposed balancing test exception
would require that there be a victim with standing to invoke it,121 so
the exclusionary rule would always apply to victimless crimes.
However, when the crime itself has precluded the victim's ability to
invoke the rule, as would be the case with homicide, that victim's
rights should be automatically asserted. 122 Thus, when the case is
homicide, the judge should, upon invocation of the exclusionary
117 See Adler, supra note 17 (exploring psychological factors of the justice a
victim gets when their transgressor is brought to justice).
118 See Janis, 428 U.S. at 443 (separating the issue of admissibility from the
violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights).
119 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 909 (declaring that if appreciable deterrence will not
result, use of the exclusionary rule is "unwarranted"). Interesting place to use the
term "unwarranted".
120 See Davis, supra note 15, at 2. One of our justice system's "basic mis-
sions" is to deter criminal activity. Id. This becomes even more important when the
crime to be deterred is against a victim, because the criminal process should center
its efforts against harm to real people. See id. In a victimless crime, no innocent
party has been harmed.
121 See discussion supra Part I.A (on victim standing). The defendant must
be the person unlawfully searched or seized upon to invoke the exclusionary rule,
not merely any aggrieved party. Janis, 428 U.S. at 447 n.16. Similarly, only the
victim of the crime should be allowed to invoke the balancing test, not merely any
aggrieved party.
122 In fact, this is where it is most important not to forget the victim's rights
because they have been vitiated to the utmost degree. Further, this is where deter-
rence of crime is the most important because the criminals are violating the most
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rule by the defendant, automatically apply the balancing test. In
this situation, the judge would look to whether the probative value
of the evidence seriously implicates the defendant in light of the
degree of intrusion by the police, and if so, the victim's rights could
trump those of the defendant. However, if the probative value is
extremely low, the degree of intrusion by the police against the de-
fendant need not be as high to overcome it.
In the proposed balancing test, the weight on the inclusion side
of the scale uses both the victim's interest in justice and the proba-
tive value of the evidence. 123 The relationship between the" two
must be one of forced proportionality or proportional limitation,
which goes to the heart of the concept of probative value. 124 Proba-
tive value can be very high or very low, depending on the relevance
of the piece of evidence.125 Likewise, the weight of the victim's in-
terest in justice may be high or low depending on the circumstances
of the crime.1 26 These two factors should not be added or multi-
plied; the strength of each should depend on the strength of the
other. 127 The weight of the probative value of the evidence and the
weight of the victim's interest in justice must be proportional in that
they limit each other and create a weight that can be balanced
against the degree of unlawful intrusion on the defendant.
This requires two examples. First, if the victim's watch was sto-
len and that watch was recovered from the defendant's residence,
the weight on the side of inclusion is limited by the relatively low
interest in justice of the victim, despite the extremely high proba-
tive value of the evidence. Second, if the victim was brutally at-
tacked with a bat and that bat was found at a bar the defendant
sacred rights of the victim, the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
123 See supra Part II.A.
124 See WEINSTEIN EVIDENCE § 401.04(2)(a) stating that "[r]elevance is not
inherent in any item of evidence but exists only as a relation between an item of
evidence and a matter properly provable in the case.").
125 See FED. R. EVID. 403 (using probative value in a balancing test). See also
Old Chief, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (applying the established rule the court balances
probative value against unfair prejudice). By using the probative value of evidence
in a balancing test there must inherently be some value judgment, which requires
the factor to have more or less weight in different circumstances. See also WEIN-
STEIN EVIDENCE § 401.04(2)(b).
126 We must all agree that when the victim has a watch stolen, his interest in
justice is less than the victim who has been brutally assaulted.
127 Otherwise, the fact that there are two factors on the victim's side of the
scale would work to the victim's advantage.
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frequented, the weight on the side of inclusion is limited by the rel-
atively low probative value of the evidence, despite the victim's ex-
tremely high interest in justice. Thus, the two factors in favor of
inclusion of the evidence must be proportionally forced or limited
by valuing their weight at their average relative value. Obviously,
having two factors on one side of the scale, we cannot merely add
them together. However, wrong-doing by the crime victim should
also limit or reduce the weight on the side of the scale for
inclusion. 128
Victims can be left without justice due to unlawful seizures
over which they had no control. 129 Victims are often more inter-
ested in punishment of the person responsible than in compensa-
tion for the wrong.130 Many say that justice should be blind.
However, an important distinction is in order. There is a difference
between a decision based on improper evidence and a decision
based on the facts. We should blind our justice to improper factors,
such as race, religion, and social status;131 however, justice should
be allowed to see and consider all other relevant facts.' 32 To re-
move consideration of bias and favoritism from the scales is blind
justice, but to remove highly relevant and substantive facts is no
more than an injustice. While defendants have a right not to be
adjudicated based on improper or irrelevant considerations, victims
should have a right to confront the defendant with any evidence
that does not utilize the factors to which justice should be blind.
Thus, the injustice to the victim should be factored into decisions
regarding the exclusionary rule.
128 See e.g. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the
Court's desire not to entangle itself in condoning lawless behavior).
129 Victims have no control over the actions of government officials and may
thereby be deprived of justice when, as Justice Cardozo eloquently put it in De-
fore, "the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." 242 N.Y. at
21 (emphasis added).
130 See Adler, supra note 17. Cf. Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A
Procedural Analysis, HARVARD LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION, 97 HARV. L. REV.
931 (1984) (generally advocating for victim restitution in the criminal process).
131 See FED. R. EVID. 403 (allowing exclusion of relevant evidence when the
danger of unfair prejudice is too high).
132 See FED. R. EVID. 402 (indicating the admissibility of all relevant evi-
dence, except as otherwise provided). See also Payner, 447 U.S. at 734 (acknowl-
edging the interest of the justice system in inclusion of probative evidence).
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3. Interests and justifications involved: the degree of intrusion
on the defendant's right to security. Opposite probative value of the
evidence and the victim's interest in justice on the scale is the de-
fendant's presumed innocence and right to security and privacy.
133
After all, defendants in our society are innocent until proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.134 The degree to which the defendant's
rights are violated by the unlawful seizure is relevant here. 135 At
least in the context of subjective evidence, the more unlawfully in-
trusive a seizure is, the less likely it is that the evidence obtained
truly shows what it is purported to prove.136 When evidence is
seized without any probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the gov-
ernment misconduct may create the heart of the case, and the evi-
dence should not be admissible against the defendant, unless the
seizure does not affect relevance and there is a victim with a valid
interest in prosecution. 137 For example, if police coerced a witness
to testify against the defendant, the means of unlawful seizure has
tainted the reliability of the evidence; this relates directly to the
probative value factor. The more unlawful the intrusion is, the
heavier the defendant's rights weigh on his side of the scale for ex-
clusion.' 38 The degree of intrusion on the defendant's right to se-
curity weighing in favor of exclusion is dependent on the
133 The Fourth Amendment was created to secure citizens from unlawful in-
trusion by government officials acting on behalf of the government. Peltier, 422
U.S. at 560 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134 Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
135 Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable where po-
lice rely on a good-faith belief that the warrant was valid, despite the fact that it is
later determined invalid). The benefit for guilty defendants is too great to fit within
our criminal justice system when the police violation of the defendant's rights are
minor or made in good-faith. Id at 908. The deterrent function of the exclusionary
rule is only furthered when police conduct is willful, or at least negligent, and
"Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith ... the deterrence
rationale loses much of its force." Id at 919. See also Strossen, supra note 11, at
1183 (indicating the Supreme Court's reliance on a balancing test that weighs in-
trusion on Fourth Amendment rights).
136 A defendant would be deprived of the essential right to a defense if state-
ments "wrung from him" were to be admissible. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 685 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). When the means of seizing evidence render it unreliable, exclusion is
appropriate, as is the case with forced confessions. Davis, supra note 15, at 2.
137 See Payner, 447 U.S. at 750.
138 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 908-9 (distinguishing for admissibility purposes a
situation where security violation was "substantial and deliberate" from a situation
where the violation was due to a "reasonable good-faith belief that a search or
seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment.").
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intrusiveness of the breach of security. Thus, the degree of intru-
sion on the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights is an appropriate
factor for the proposed balancing test.
C. Location of the Power to Cause Evidence to Be Suppressed
According to Justice Cardozo, the exclusionary rule grants "the
pettiest peace officer [the] power through over-zeal or indiscretion
to confer immunity upon an offender for crimes the most flagi-
tious."'1 39 Police officers and other law enforcement agencies have
retained the power to cause evidence to be suppressed on the
grounds of unlawful seizure since 1914, when the Court introduced
the rule that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment
could not be used in federal court.140 Although it has not socially
been viewed as a power, the fact that actions of the police deter-
mine whether the evidence will be admitted makes it a type of
power over the admission of evidence. 141 If an officer unlawfully
seizes a piece of evidence, the judge would be bound to suppress
it.142 The judge has some discretion in determining whether the
seizure was unlawful, 143 but the judge is bound to exclude evidence
in situations where it would deter police misconduct. 144 It is impor-
tant, however, to consider that this balancing discretion could be-
come a type of veto over the exclusionary rule for judges not
wanting to bend the facts.145 Yet this test could only apply when
the victim has invoked it.146 Thus, the actions of the police in
seizure of the evidence determine whether the evidence will be ad-
139 Defore, 242 N.Y. at 19-20.
140 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383. The Court stated in the Weeks
case that using evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment involved "a
denial of the constitutional rights of the accused." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648.
141 See Kamisar, supra note 4, at 9 (noting in a quote that the exclusionary
rule gives police the power to grant immunity by being intentionally overzealous).
142 See generally Mapp, 367 U.S. 643 (holding that the exclusionary rule ap-
plies to state courts, as well as federal courts, due to the constitutional nature of
the rule).
143 See generally Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (holding that the exclusionary rule is not
binding when the seizure was made in reasonable good-faith belief that the search
was valid but was later found invalid because this would do no service toward
deterring police misconduct). Furthermore, courts often admit evidence that
would otherwise be excluded due to the good-faith exception. See e.g., Williams,
_F.Supp.2d_, 2001 WL 1631417.
144 See supra Part I.A.
145 See Kamisar, supra note 4, at 18.
146 See supra Part II.A.
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mitted. This is dangerous. because a police officer could be paid by
the defendant to seize evidence in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment in order to prevent its admissibility at trial.
It is important to note here that the fictions of media may in-
fluence society's perceptions of our government, and as such the
possibilities presented in television shows present questions as to
the state of our judicial system. To say something is not a real point
because it did not in fact happen is to reject the idea that we can
learn from a hypothetical. For example, in the "Boston Confiden-
tial" episode of The Practice147 a female police officer opened the
defendant's trunk based. on a traffic infraction to reveal the defen-
dant's wife's dead body.148 The judge questioned the officer and
excluded the evidence, which ended the case. 149 The attorney later
discovered that the defendant and the officer were having an inti-
mate affair and had plotted to kill the wife.150 Since the evidence
was excluded and the case dropped, the defendant would be pro-
tected by the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy and
thereby had protection from future prosecution. This program
shows how an officer can confer immunity on a defendant, albeit a
fictional account, as recognized by Justice Cardozo years ago.151
This is unfortunate because the means of obtaining objective evi-
dence does not change the fact that the evidence exists. Our courts
serve a truth-finding function, and the Court has stifled that func-
tion in the name of preserving rights properly protected by the
Legislature.
The Supreme Court has stated that the primary, if not sole,
reason for the exclusionary rule is to deter police from future
Fourth Amendment violations. 152 There is some appeal to this rea-
soning because police officers would not want the work they put
into obtaining the evidence to be wasted due to the exclusionary
rule. However, "[t]he rule does not inflict a 'punishment' on police
who violate the fourth amendment; exclusion does not leave the
147 This is a television dramatization, but it demonstrates the potential, or
possibly actual, problem exceptionally. Furthermore, television surely affects pub-
lic perception of the criminal justice system.




151 See Defore, 242 N.Y. 13.
152 See discussion supra Part I.A.
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police in a worse position than if they had never violated the Con-
stitution."'1 53 The police will get their paychecks despite the out-
come of any given case, 154 and there seem to be better deterrents
than evisceration of the victim's rights. Police found to violate a
defendant's right to security could be sanctioned or suspended.
155
Such direct consequences to the responsible officer are probably
even more likely to deter unlawful seizure. 156 An officer facing the
decision of whether to seize a piece of evidence will most likely be
more influenced by the possibility of sanctions or suspension than
by the possible suppression of that evidence in court. Sanctions and
suspension not only provide better deterrence, but they also do not
impose on the victim's rights because, unlike exclusion, there is no
unjust enrichment for the defendant. Thus, the fear of sanctions
and suspension would work better to cause police to allot the
proper gravity in their decision on seizure than does the fear of
suppression of the evidence.
D. Resolution of Competing Interests
The competing interests are victims' as well as society's interest
in justice versus the defendant's and society's interest in securing
privacy. Our legal system has per se protected the defendant's right
to security over the rights to justice. 157 These interests should in-
stead be balanced against one another based on the circumstances
of the particular case. Where the defendant is merely trying to
avoid an otherwise foregone conviction by alluding to a right to se-
curity based on a technicality, the judge should be allowed to refuse
the defendant this subversion of our system. On the other hand,
where the defendant has been intruded upon without reason to be
153 Kamisar, 86 MICH. L. REV. at n. 147.
154 This is not to say that police do not have any incentive to unlawfully
search and seize, but merely that the job does not require it and in fact prohibits it.
155 See discussion supra Part I.C. The Supreme Court has already provided
for these types of sanctioning remedies for Fourth Amendment violations where
they would equally deter future police misconduct.
156 See Wayne Beyer, Principles Governing Money Damages and Other Relief
Under 42 U.SC. §198 3, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 154 (1996). "Punitive damages punish
and deter." Id. See Kenneth Jost, Exclusionary Rule Reforms Advance: Oppo-
nents claim proposals unconstitutional, encourage police misconduct, 81 A.B.A.J.
18 (1995) (noting a proposed bill that would recognize a judicial action against law
enforcement with punitive damages up to $10,000).
157 See supra Part L.A (discussing deterrence as the sole factor of the exclu-
sionary rule).
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suspected and the case was based on that intrusion, the judge
should be allowed to suppress the evidence.
Society's interest in justice lies in part in the danger of future
similar conduct by either the defendant or others.' 58 It is essential
to our justice system for the public to perceive that it is capable of
arrest, conviction and punishment of the guilty. 15 9 If defendants are
not punished for crimes we know they have committed, they will be
more likely to believe they can get away with crime in the future.
Similarly, society's interest in security contemplates deterrence of
crime in general, which will be lower if people see criminals go
free.' 60 Society's interest in security also includes deterrence of un-
lawful police intrusion.1 61 However, unclean hands dilute and pol-
lute these societal interests. 162 Society acts through the police who
have unlawfully violated the defendant's rights. Because the entity
of society has chosen not to abide by its own rules and now has
unclean hands we should disregard these interests. 63 In the case of
a victimless crime this would be determinative and the evidence
would be excluded because there would be nothing to weigh against
the defendant's rights.' 64 However, when there is a victim we must
consider the relevant rights and interests.
Victims' interests should play a part in determining whether to
exclude unlawfully seized evidence.' 65 Indeed there is a statute or
common law in almost'every state allowing victims to speak at sen-
tencing, and the Supreme Court has held that judges may weigh
victim impact into murder sentencing.1 66 The victim is the one who
158 See Davis, supra note 15, at 2.
159 See Davis, supra note 15, at 2
160 One of our justice system's basic missions is to deter crime. See Davis,
supra note 15, at 2.
161 See supra Part I.A.
162 See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 654 (Clark, J., dissenting) (saying, that "[N]o
State should be considered to have a vested interest in keeping prisoners in jail
who were convicted because of lawless conduct by the State officials.").
163 The exclusionary rule's deterrence of police misconduct will remain intact
since the proposed test is merely a type of affirmative defense to the exclusionary
rule as it stands.
164 See supra Part II.B.2.
165 The Department of State has recognized victims' interest in justice. See
Adler, supra note 17.
166 See Adler, supra note 17. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 390.30(30(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1994). In New York, a pre-sentence investigation ". . . report
must contain a victim impact statement, unless it appears that such information
would be of no relevance to the recommendation or court disposition.... ." Id. For
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has suffered and seeks justice for this harm. People are generally
considered to be free to do whatever they desire so long as they do
not infringe on other people's rights. Our desire to deter these inju-
ries is one of the central reasons for punishing criminals.167 It is the
injury to the victim that justifies inclusion of evidence despite un-
lawful seizure; if there were no harm, there would be no crime to
which this test would apply. 168 When the victim has not partici-
pated in the unlawful seizure, his rights should not be disregarded
due to the unclean hands doctrine; the victim's right might even be
strong enough to overcome the need for deterrence of police mis-
conduct inherent in the exclusionary rule.
The victim's interest in justice can be appraised in part by look-
ing to the severity of the crime and the extent of injury to the vic-
tim. 169  Judges should, however, beware of prosecutors
overcharging for strategic purposes. 70 A judge might look to
whether the injury was physical or merely a loss of property,
whether the defendant was central or peripheral to the crime,
whether the victim's life was in danger as well as other factors rele-
vant to the particular case. This interest must of course be averaged
with the probative value of the evidence for a result proportional to
the defendant's rights.
The defendant's security interest should be presumptively fa-
vored due to the explicit constitutional prohibition of unlawful
searches and seizures. 171 Exclusion of evidence should be pre-
served for drastic cases of police misconduct. 172 Under the pro-
posed test, a victim can move to invoke discretionary balancing
only after the court finds that there was an unlawful seizure, 173 thus
the victim should carry the burden of showing that his rights clearly
outweigh the defendant's. When police violate the Fourth Amend-
a comprehensive list see Carrie Mulholland, Note, 60 Mo. L. REV. 731, n. 74
(1995).
167 See Davis, supra note 15 (indicating that a failure in confidence of the
people in the legal system can lead to a lack of respect for the law, which breeds
turmoil).
168 This test only applies where there is an identifiable victim. See supra Part
II.A.
169 Kaplan has urged that the defendant's "reprehensibility" can be deter-
mined by looking the crime charged. See Kamisar, 86 MICH. L. REV. at 12.
170 See Kamisar, 86 MICH. L. REV. at 14.
171 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
172 Kamisar, supra note 4, at 7.
173 See supra Part II.A.
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ment they infringe on the defendant's rights. The degree to which
they intrude upon the defendant's privacy and security is to be the
weight of the defendant's security interest. 174 The reprehensibility
of the defendant's conduct should weigh into a decision on whether
to exclude evidence. 175 There is certainly more reason to exclude
evidence obtained when a group of police officers ransack the de-
fendant's home due to prejudice or targeting than there is when a
police officer merely opens the trunk of the defendant's car without
permission or probable cause. Certain rare factors that carry a
greater necessity for deterrence, such as racial discrimination,
should increase the weight on the exclusion side of the scale.
176
Courts should balance the gravity of the intrusion on the defendant
against the seriousness of the crime and exclude probative evidence
when "the reprehensibility of the officer's illegality is greater than
the defendant's.' 77
E. Usefulness of the Test
In People v. Foster, the New York Appellate Division, Second
Department, reversed the defendant's jury convictions of second-
degree murder and first-degree robbery based on the trial court's
failure to suppress a razor seized from the defendant. 78 The defen-
dant, James Foster, and an acquaintance, Raymond Pittman, forced
their way into Cornell Moon's apartment. 179 One of the men put a
knife or razor to Moon's son's throat, and the other man shot and
killed Moon. 180 On the following day a confidential informant told
Detective Anthony Cerasi that two men involved in Moon's killing
were in a Locust Hill Avenue apartment in Yonkers. 181 Cerasi and
174 See supra Part II.A.
175 See Kamisar, supra note 4, at 1 (excluding probative evidence and letting
criminals go "free to prey upon the public should shock the judicial conscience
even more than admitting the (unlawfully seized) evidence.").
176 One of the primary criticisms of the exclusionary rule is a failure to allo-
cate different weight to inadvertent or minimal police error versus deliberate or
grave police misconduct. See Kamisar, 86 MICH. L. REV. at 6.
177 See Kamisar, supra note 4, at 3. Furthermore, the exclusionary rule un-
dermines the legal system by treating over-zealous police officers as a greater
threat than the unpunished murderer, embezzler or panderer. Id at 5. Some
scholars would distinguish the murderer from the embezzler and panderer. Id.
178 People v. Foster, 458 N.Y.S. 2d 645 (App. Div. 1983).
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Foster, 458 N.Y.S. 2d at 645-6.
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other officers, acting on this information, went to the apartment.18
2
At the suppression hearing, Cerasi testified that he told the defen-
dant "they were being taken to headquarters under suspicion of
robbery, and homicide," and that the defendant then said, "I guess
you are going to search me. ' 18 3 Cerasi then testified that Foster
told him he had a razor in his pocket, so Cerasi reached in and
removed the razor. 84 During the subsequent investigation, Moon's
son identified Pittman as one of the assailants. 85 The court found
that the officers' conduct; searching, handcuffing, and transporting
Foster to police headquarters; constituted an arrest requiring prob-
able cause.186 Thus, the court concluded that the razor should have
been suppressed based on the unlawful arrest.' 87 The court re-
jected the People's argument that the defendant's statement about
the razor was free and unprovoked because Cerasi told Foster that
he was being taken to headquarters under suspicion of robbery and
homicide.188
If the court had applied the proposed balancing test, the out-
come would likely have been different. Under the test, the appel-
late court could have required trial court findings regarding the
probative value of the razor, the Moons' interest in justice, and the
degree of intrusion upon Foster. The probative value here is very
high, since the evidence in question was a razor purportedly used by
the assailant as a weapon. The Moons' interest in justice is ex-
tremely high, unless they had unclean hands, since the father was
killed and the son had a blade put to his throat. Foster would have
been allowed to show any illegal, inequitable, or wrongful conduct
of the Moons, such as if the robbery was a response to something
Mr. Moon had done to the defendant. Any such showing would
accordingly diminish the Moons' interest in justice. Finally, the de-
gree of intrusion on Foster was minimal. Foster told Cerasi that the
blade was in his pocket and permitted the detective to take it.
There was no fraud, coercion, or undue force used by Cerasi. In
182 Id. at 646.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Foster, 458 N.Y.S. 2d at 646.
186 Id. (finding that Foster's detention was "identical" to Pittman's).
187 Id.
188 Foster, 458 N.Y.S. 2d at 646 (adding that "since the razor was revealed as a
direct consequence of unlawful police action, it was tainted evidence and should
have been suppressed").
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conclusion, the high probative value of the razor, the Moons' high
interest in justice, and the low degree of intrusion on Foster would
allow the tangible evidence to be admitted, unless Foster had shown
some wrongdoing by the Moons.
Ill. CONCLUSION AND POSSIBLE MEANS OF IMPLEMENTATION
"Whenever we sacrifice critical evidence to deter police miscon-
duct, we should continuously try to identify acceptable alternatives to
such a draconian result."1 89 The exclusionary rule has become part
of our jurisprudence due to the unsupported assumption of the Su-
preme Court that exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence deters fu-
ture misconduct. 190 Yet the Court has provided for the States to
supplement or replace the rule with alternative procedures that
equally deter future unlawful police misconduct. 191 This Note pro-
poses a balancing test, not to replace the exclusionary rule, but to
supplement the rule so as to congeal the exceptions and implement
consideration of victims' rights and probative value of the evidence.
State legislatures could adopt the proposed balancing test and pro-
vide penalties against those found, in a separate hearing, to be in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 192 However, even if the test is
not accepted as it has been proposed, it is important to incorporate
the victims' rights and probative value of the evidence into any de-
cision on the exclusion of evidence.
The judiciary branch has stated that the police may not unlaw-
fully intrude on the suspect's privacy consistently with the Constitu-
tion.193 However, by establishing the exclusionary rule, the Court
has put its hand into preventing executive authority from infringing
on the rights "secured" by the Fourth Amendment. State and fed-
eral legislatures have not addressed the problem, perhaps deferring
to the courts that have begun to handle the situation. In fact, the
189 Davis, supra note 15, at 2.
190 The Court assumes that exclusion is the best means of deterrence. See
discussion supra Part II.C. Society may assume that exclusion of unlawfully seized
evidence is a constitutional mandate, which is not.
191 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 630.
192 Indeed "[tihe exclusionary rule was a judicial effort to fill a legislative
void," and "Congress [has] deferred to executive police authority, unfettered by
constitutional restrictions." William Westmiller, Exclusionary Rule Contends Two
Wrongs Make a Right, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Dec. 3, 1998, Editorials, B07.
193 See Mapp, 367 U.S. 643.
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sole defense against police terrorism is the exclusionary rule.
194
Congress has been made aware of the Supreme Court's willingness
to alter the exclusionary rule based on a finding that it does not
deter police misconduct. 195 Although imposing punitive damages
on the offending officer is most appropriately left to the legislature,
the courts should begin to look to these types of remedies in the
absence of some legislative response. If the legislatures intended to
not punish police violation of the Fourth Amendment, they could
certainly make laws to prevent judicial sanctions. Yet these laws
would raise the question of constitutionality because the legisla-
tures would be refusing to protect a right secured by the Constitu-
tion while preventing the courts from protecting that right.
Some critics have suggested punishing the law enforcement
agency that employs the officer found to have violated a defen-
dant's security rights. One possibility is to provide an exemption
from the exclusionary rule for law enforcement agencies that meet
certain standards for identifying, investigating and punishing em-
ployees who violate defendants' right to security.' 96 Other alterna-
tives include civil action by the disturbed citizen and criminal
contempt against the offending officer. 197 There has long been de-
bate over means of protecting defendants' rights without excluding
concededly relevant evidence, and many possibilities have been
provided that could protect the right to security without stepping on
victims' rights as significantly as the exclusionary rule as it stands.
Thus, the inquiry of admissibility should focus not on police miscon-
duct but on the injury to the defendant by unlawful seizure, the
injury to the victim of the crime, and the relevance of the evidence
to the crime.
Raymond Hayes
194 William Westmiller, Exclusionary Rule Contends Two Wrongs Make a
Right, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Dec. 3, 1998, B07.
195 Jost, 81 A.B.A.J. at 18.
196 Davis, supra at note 15, at 2.
197 See Kamisar, supra at note 4, at n.216.

